On the
other hand, the same Western policy-makers and analysts will speak of Russian
President Vladimir Putin’s aggression against Ukraine, determination to stoke
conflict in the east, and uncompromising stance in negotiations on Ukraine’s
geoeconomic and geopolitical orientation. There is merit to both of these
strands of analysis. But for an accurate understanding of Ukraine’s options – a
prerequisite for effective strategy – they need to be considered in relation to
each other. The Chinese wall that has been erected between these two streams of
analysis is bound to produce policy failure. The reason lies in what can be
called Ukraine’s reform Catch 22.
It is certainly true that President Petro Poroshenko
and the government that will be formed imminently will come under tremendous
pressure to implement an ambitious structural reform agenda. The question of
external financing looms large in this context: Ukraine’s fiscal and broader
economic viability will soon come under serious strain unless the IMF and EU
assistance packages are significantly augmented and accelerated. Without major
steps forward on reform, this boost will not be possible. So the West has
significant leverage to push on the government, and the reformers within the
government have significant leverage to push on their opponents. Further, not
only will Western governments and the IMF demand reform, but Ukraine’s
activists, civic groups, and society at large will do so as well. Only 36 percent of
Ukrainians polled in September believe that their country is heading in the
right direction. The political elite is acutely aware of the potential for
political and social unrest if they fail to provide a sense of hope about the
future to their people.
The Catch 22 here relates to the “perils”
of successful reform. If Poroshenko and the new government succeed in passing
significant reforms, the taps of financial support from the West will be
opened. Indeed, Ukraine is likely to receive ever closer integration with
Western institutions in that case as well – not just billions more dollars and
Euros.
How all these positive developments would
be received in Moscow is fairly obvious: Putin will consider increased Western
engagement with Ukraine in zero-sum terms. The reason is clear: his leverage over Kyiv’s decision-making
will be diminished by a dramatic increase in Western support and integration for
the Ukrainian government. If any lesson can be learned from Russian behavior in
the past nine months, it is that Putin will act to increase his leverage over
Ukraine when he feels that it has been diminished. In short, if Ukraine
succeeds in its reforms, further Russian economic warfare or direct military
intervention in the east will become much more likely. “Damned if you do” as
the saying goes.
One might conclude that this cost of
success might diminish the chances of reform dramatically. However, here we
encounter the “damned if you don’t” aspect of Ukraine’s Catch 22. If Kyiv does not reform, it will not receive
augmented Western assistance, and therefore it will be forced to strike a deal
with Moscow to obtain subsidies from the Kremlin instead. The terms of that
deal would certainly rule out further Russian intervention and trade wars.
However, the combination of no reform and a grand bargain with Moscow is a
recipe for political instability in today’s Ukraine, given the high degree of
political mobilization, radicalization and the state’s loss of the monopoly on
the use of force.
The Ukrainian government and its friends in
the West need to tear down the Chinese wall they have constructed in their
minds between the reform narrative and Russian intervention analysis. Both must
be considered holistically in order to forge a successful strategy for Ukraine
in the medium term, specifically one that takes into account potential Russian
reactions to reforms. The first step is acknowledging that reform cannot
succeed if Russia is determined to make it fail. Ideally, this would lead
Ukraine and the West to make a comprehensive settlement of the conflict a major
and organic component of the reform push. Given the current climate of
antagonism and mistrust, this ideal outcome is a low probability, and
governments should prepare for worst cases. In that case, Ukraine, the EU and
the US should have contingency plans ready in case of Russian efforts to
undermine reform. These plans should entail efforts to “harden the target”:
steps to make Ukraine more resilient to economic and conventional warfare. They
should also involve efforts to maximize transparency so as to avoid
misinterpretation of intentions, and, if the conflict escalates, to reassure
through costly signals, such as reaffirmed commitment not to seek membership in
NATO.
VoxUkraine for Kyivpost
Samuel Charap, Senior Fellow for Russia and Eurasia, International Institute for Strategic Studies
