Editor’s Note: The following is a Q&A with Alexander S. Vindman, Ukraine-born retired U.S. Army lieutenant colonel, who served as the European Affairs director for the U.S. National Security Council in 2018-2020. He testified before Congress on Oct. 29, 2019, during former U.S. President Donald Trump’s impeachment trial about Trump’s attempts to get Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky to investigate then-Democratic rival, current U.S. President Joe Biden. Here is the entire transcript. Vindman spoke to Kyiv Post columnist Sergii Leshchenko on Sept. 11, 2021, at the Yalta European Strategy (YES) conference in Kyiv.
Kyiv Post: Alexander, I’m glad to see you in Kyiv. Is this your home town?
Alexander Vindman: I apologize that I don’t speak Ukrainian. I rarely do, I only studied the language for eight months in the war college 12 years ago. I was born in Kyiv in 1975, but I only lived here for five years. Our family immigrated, and I grew up in New York, so I am an American. We were refugees, a Jewish family. Our family had two reasons to leave the Soviet Union. First, my mother died of cancer and my father heard that the Shah of Iran (Mohammad Reza Pahlavi) also had the disease and got cured in New York. Second, anti-Semitism. We didn’t have equal opportunities like the Jews in the Soviet Union, and it would have been a better life for us in the U.S.
KP: Did you attend a war college there?
AV: I attended a military department in the university and began serving in the Army. This was around 20 years ago. I served for 21.5 years in the army. I started as an infantryman for the first 10 years and afterward could choose my major. I chose geopolitics and finished my master’s in Harvard, chose the Ukrainian language, worked in the Moscow Embassy from 2012 to 2015 under Ambassadors Mike McFaul and John F. Tefft. In 2015, I arrived to the U.S. and started service at the Pentagon. I was the advisor for the general staff if we were to find a Ukrainian equivalent. (The chairman of the joint chiefs.) This is not an easy job, I was developing the main policy towards Russia, as I am a specialist on Russia. After that, I was asked to transfer to the White House. Since I understood the Ukrainian language and worked in Kyiv at the embassy from 2009-2010, I was asked to be in charge of Ukraine, Moldova, Belarus and the Caucasus.
Then-National Security Council Ukraine expert Lt. Colonel Alexander Vindman leaves the Longworth building after testifying during the House Intelligence Committee hearing, into President Donald Trump’s alleged efforts to tie US aid for Ukraine to investigations of his political opponents, on Capitol Hill in Washington, D.C. on Nov. 19, 2019. (AFP)
KP: You were part of the delegation at President Volodymyr Zelensky’s inauguration?
AV: Yes, and not only. I coordinated and prepared the U.S. delegation led by National Security Adviser John Bolton to attend the 2018 Ukrainian Independence Day celebrations. Then we met with President Petro Poroshenko. And then I was in the delegation led by Kurt Volker in December 2018. 2019 was the last time I was in Ukraine and have not come back for two and a half years.
KP: You were also the director of the Department for Europe in the U.S. Security Council.
AV: This is not entirely correct. This is the position of the director. This means that there was no big headquarters, but there was a person who coordinated the entire U.S. policy on Ukraine for the White House among all specialists from the State Department, the Pentagon, and so on. I coordinated this policy at my level. I am currently pursuing a Ph.D. at Johns Hopkins University, writing a paper on how Ukraine influenced U.S. politics after 1991.
KP: How do you think Ukraine is changing? How does it look through the eyes of a U.S. specialist?
AV: I have been coming to Ukraine for 12 years now, and I want to say that your country has changed dramatically. In 2009, I visited here for the first time since our emigration, was at the end of President (Viktor) Yushchenko’s term, and since then I have been constantly visiting, and I am very pleased to see how this country is slowly moving forward. I didn’t come during (President Viktor) Yanukovych’s presidency, he interrupted the direction of the country’s development, and I don’t know if my impressions would have been positive or not. But since then, I have been visiting Kyiv every year and see changes. I walk the streets, talk to people and see that the country is moving forward.
Alexander S. Vindman is the author of “Here, Right Matters.”
KP: Ukraine wants to secure its progress by joining NATO. Zelensky asks: ‘Why is Ukraine not in NATO?’ U.S. President Joe Biden responds: ‘Make reforms, fight corruption.’ How fair is this statement?
AV: This is a purely political statement. There is a level of requirement that must be reached in order to join NATO. But we know that in different periods of time not everyone reached this level when they were admitted to NATO. At the moment, there is still work for Ukraine that needs to be done in order to “cleanly” enter NATO, meaning deservedly. But at the same time, NATO does not always accept (members) based purely on their merit. This is a political decision. And in this sense, Ukraine is not far away. The U.S. rhetoric often says “Ukraine is a strategic partner.” But in reality, we need to make sure that Ukraine is indeed a strategic partner. It is necessary to help Ukraine, and the sooner this happens, the better it will be not only for NATO, the European Union, but also for the bilateral relations between Ukraine and the U.S.
KP: Yet, when will Ukraine join NATO?
AV: It’s hard to answer. Ukraine can achieve membership in NATO within five years, that is, by fulfilling all the requirements for membership. But in reality, I don’t think this will happen. If we do not reconsider our policy in the U.S., if the EU does not reconsider its policy, then Ukraine will not join NATO.
KP: Do the NATO members themselves lack the will?
AV: Yes. But if we evaluate Ukraine as a strategic partner and give it assistance, five years will be enough to fulfill all the requirements. This is my personal opinion, but I believe that much more needs to be done to help Ukraine. And Russia, too, will not be able to continue authoritarian politics if Ukraine is a successful country. This is one of the main reasons to help Ukraine.
KP: What is Biden’s view of Ukraine?
AV: I’m not sure I know. He’s been here many times. He himself understands your country quite well, he also wants success for Ukraine.
KP: Many in Ukraine perceived his deal with German Chancellor Angela Merkel on Nord Stream 2 as a betrayal.
AV: No, I do not agree with that. I think that Ukraine does not feel that he is a friend because Biden has so many responsibilities at the moment. And there is simply not enough attention, and the priorities are focused on other goals. The internal problems of the U.S. are the first priority, then – to keep our allies close, and then Ukraine at some point. I think Biden is unhappy with the way things are ending around Nord Stream 2. Nobody in the U.S. knows about Nord Stream 2, and even if Congress supports sanctions on the operational activities of Nord Stream 2, this is also not a high priority for the U.S. I am also not completely sure that Nord Stream 2 is a big thing.
KP: If Nord Stream 2 is launched, Ukraine will lose $2 billion in gas transit, there is a risk to Ukraine’s security. Russia’s President Vladimir Putin will no longer be restrained from attacking Ukraine by gas transit through Ukraine.
AV: I don’t think gas transit through Ukraine has ever restrained Putin. The reason is that Putin knows that Ukraine is not the country it used to be in 2014, and Ukraine will withstand his attack. Russians will have huge losses and Putin doesn’t need that. Income from the gas transit is rather big: At some point, the sum was equal to Ukraine’s Defense Ministry budget. But Ukraine also needs to develop its energy business to change the situation with the money.
KP: What do you think about Zelensky’s trip to the U.S. to visit Biden?
AV: This visit was much better than the previous one in 2019. I was worried that Ukraine wasn’t going to be a priority because of the Afghanistan issue. Photographs and videos from meetings in the White House were not impressive. I felt slightly relieved when the two-side agreement was released: It contained specific steps towards the bilateral relations. The allocated resources are not huge — $60 million is actually a small amount of money. But the spheres of cooperation are actually good — in the energy sector, economy, and the fight against corruption. Economy, energy, and security are the main areas. Strategic negotiations are to be held within the next few months and there is a chance to move this relationship forward. But I’m not fully satisfied that the U.S. doesn’t seem to fully understand Ukraine’s impact on the region and even at a larger level of geopolitics. It’s not a small country, it’s the biggest in Europe and it has great potential. In our competition with Russia, we can achieve a lot through Ukraine.
KP: I can’t help but ask you about former U.S. President Donald Trump and his phone call with Zelensky.
AV: I have just released a book on that issue and the first part begins with the two presidents’ call.
KP: What did the call look like to someone who eyewitnessed it?
AV: My workplace was located at the Dwight Eisenhower building, where the National Security Council staff is based. The White House and Dwight Eisenhower building share a yard. That day, I relocated from my office to the West Wing situation room, a closed meeting room. I coordinated that call, just like the other call in April 2019 with Trump’s congratulations to then-newly elected President Zelensky. The first call was successful, but the second one was different. Even before the call took place, I was disappointed with what happened on the U.S. side and was worried that it wouldn’t work out how we wanted. My boss Bolton tried to cancel the phone call. I thought that the call should take place as there should be an opportunity for the presidents to talk. That could have saved the situation. But Bolton was thinking differently, he was afraid that something bad would happen.
KP: Did Bolton already know about Trump’s blackmail on Ukraine?
AV: I knew about that too. The day before, there was a meeting between (former Energy Secretary) Rick Perry, (U.S. Ambassador to the EU) Gordon Sondland and (former special envoy to Ukraine) Kurt Volker on the U.S. side and (ex-Finance Minister) Oleksandr Danyliuk and (Zelensky’s chief of staff) Andriy Yermak. At the end of that conversation, Sondland suggested blackmail. So we just ended the negotiations at that moment. I refused to do it. I gave the first testimony saying that we were not going to do it, we were not politicians, and such method had nothing in common with U.S. security.
KP: Whom did you testify to?
AV: The same people I testified to the second time — the senior lawyers who are to ensure that the president’s actions are consistent with the law. And in July 2019, during Trump’s call to Zelensky, it became clear that Trump was personally promoting this deal. Until that moment, there was not enough evidence to say whether the U.S. president was involved in pressuring Zelensky or not. Not only was he involved, but he was the driving force behind that blackmail. Let’s get back to what happened on July 25, 2019: I came to work very early, at around 6 a.m. to prepare for the call. At 9 a.m. I went to the West Wing of the White House, to the Situation Room, with five more people in it besides me. Trump was talking (with Zelensky) not from this room, but from his residence, which is in the other wing of the White House. I heard everything in that phone call. There is a transcript of it, so one can also read it. As soon as I heard Trump, I realized that the phone call would not only not help in the U.S.-Ukraine relationship, but it would be a step back, if not worse. The military support has already been suspended by that time. I was hoping the call could help in resuming it. But it turned out the other way around. I didn’t spend much time thinking after the call. I knew exactly what my responsibility was, so I filed a report on the call — through official channels, not through the media — to John Eisenberg, the White House’s legal adviser on national security, one of the oldest officers in the White House.
KP: Your scientific work is called “How Ukraine influenced U.S. foreign policy.” Did it really have an influence in fact?
AV: Not always and not directly in bilateral relations. It often had an influence through Russia or the EU. It all started in 1991 with the “Chicken Kyiv” speech (given by U.S. President George H. W. Bush in Kyiv). In the process of nuclear disarmament, we did not perceive Ukraine as an independent country. It had huge nuclear potential but it was necessary to conduct relations through Russia.
KP: It’s quite a popular opinion nowadays that Ukraine should have kept its nuclear weapons, and it would have helped Ukraine to not become (Russia’s) victim in the Donbas and Crimea.
AV: I don’t think it’s true. I did many interviews with Ukrainian experts for my scientific work. In fact, Ukraine has gained a lot from these disarmament negotiations. Ukraine couldn’t maintain nuclear weapons, it was necessary to invest billions of dollars just to keep it so that there were no accidents. There was no capability to use it. It was necessary to somehow alter the control system, based on how the nuclear potential was arranged. But it was impossible to do it technically. In exchange for nuclear weapons, Ukraine received $100 million and a meeting with (U.S. President Bill) Clinton, which was very important because it helped in asserting the sovereignty of Ukraine. This opened the door for negotiations between Ukraine and NATO and became the foundation for the Kuchma-Gore commission. Nothing would have happened if Ukraine didn’t get rid of the nuclear weapons. One can say that it’s been 25 years and Russia used a very difficult moment, after the EuroMaidan Revolution, to be able to attack Ukraine. But the absence of nuclear weapons was not the reason. There were also many internal problems in Ukraine that allowed Putin to attack the country. You should recall how Yanukovych continued the lease of the Black Sea Fleet until 2042, how the Armed Forces of Ukraine lost their potential. In retrospect, it looks like Ukraine had no other option but to abandon nuclear weapons.
